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We examine whether an economy can have a bad (small or no formal sector, high
taxes) as well as a good (small or no informal sector, low taxes) equilibrium. When
the government maximizes instantaneous formal sector welfare, this can occur if the
elasticity of average to marginal cost for the public good is less than one. More regard
for the informal sector leads to a worse equilibrium, and a higher prevalence of multiple
equilibria.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The informal sector, also known as black, underground, or unoﬃc a le c o n o m y ,i sl a r g e
and growing around the world (see Table 1). There are two reasons why economists
should worry about this. The ﬁrst is that production in the informal sector is relatively
ineﬃcient. The informal sector producers try to avoid being caught. They cannot
make use of public goods like the police force and courts of law to enforce contracts.
This makes it diﬃcult to sell products, to employ labour and above all, to borrow
capital (Straub [34]). In addition, there is imperfect information about trading and
employment opportunities in the informal sector (Anderberg et al. [4]).
The second reason to worry about the informal sector is that it doesn’t pay taxes for
the public goods that it does make use of. This means that the tax burden on the formal
sector is larger than it would otherwise be.1 As a result, the formal sector becomes less
attractive as an employer and supplier of goods and services. More business moves to
the informal sector, which means that taxes for the formal sector have to rise. There
is the danger of a vicious circle, which may end in most or all of the economic activity
being carried out “underground”.
If this bad equilibrium were the only possible outcome, a fundamental change in
policy or in the exogenous parameters would be needed to achieve a better outcome.
But the outlook may not be quite as bleak, because by the same reasoning used above,
a virtuous circle may also be possible. In a virtuous circle, the formal sector expands.
There are more people to shoulder the tax burden, so tax rates decrease. This makes
the formal sector more attractive, and business moves from the informal to the formal
sector, etcetera. In the end, most or all of the economic activity takes place “above
ground”. In this case, all an economy in a vicious circle needs is a temporary policy
change, rather than a fundamental change. The government needs to implement a
one-oﬀ r e d u c t i o ni nt h es i z eo ft h ei n f o r m a ls ector, enough for the formal sector to
reach critical mass and to set the economy on the path to the good equilibrium.
1Schneider and Enste [30] point out that there are also positive ﬁscal eﬀects of the shadow economy.
The informal sector may supply intermediate products to the formal sector, and money earned in the
informal sector is spent in the formal sector. These considerations do not apply to our model.
2Table 1: Size of the informal sector as a percentage of oﬃcial GDP
category 1990/1 1999/2000
lowest highest average lowest highest average
Africa 22.1 47.3 33.9 28.1 59.4 41.2
Asia 8.2 43.2 20.9 11.3 52.6 26.3
Latin America 13.6 55.4 34.2 19.8 67.1 41.5
Transition countries 14.3 57.8 31.5 18.9 67.3 37.9
OECD 6.7a 22.8a 13.2a 8.6 28.7 16.8
Source: compiled from Schneider (2005)
a. 1989/1990
What we want to investigate is whether there can be multiple equilibria in an
economy: a bad equilibrium with most or all economic activity in the informal sector,
and a good one with most or all business in the formal sector. The existence of multiple
equilibria would make it easier for policy makers to escape from a bad equilibrium. It
could also explain why the size of the informal sector diﬀers so much between otherwise
similar countries, as we see in Table 1. One country may be caught in a bad equilibrium,
while the other country, through good fortune or appropriate policy, is in the good
equilibrium. While the idea of vicious and vir t u o u sc y c l e si si n t u i t i v e l ya p p e a l i n ga n d
has been discussed in the literature,2 it has hardly been modelled yet. The only formal
model so far is by Johnson et al. [19], which as we shall see has some shortcomings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature,
paying special attention to Johnson et al. [19]. In Section 3, we introduce our model.
In Section 4, we investigate the existence of multiple equilibria. We conclude with
Section 5.
2 Review of the literature
2.1 General overview
In this section we shall review the literature on the informal sector, but ﬁrst we discuss
the related subjects of corruption and tax evasion.
In our model we ignore corruption, which is relevant for the informal sector in two
2E.g. Schneider and Enste [30], pp. 77-8, Mueller [25], p. 540.
3ways. First, formal sector workers may have to bribe government oﬃcials in order to
receive the required licences. They may have to pay to speed up the licencing process,
or to receive them in the ﬁrst place (Sarte [28]; Choi and Thum [10]). Secondly, informal
sector workers may have the opportunity to bribe government oﬃcials in order to escape
punishment.
Another link between corruption and informal sector activity is that both are illegal
activities that can give rise to multiple equilibria. Multiple equilibria with corruption
can arise because the probability of being caught (Lui [22], Mauro [24]), the punishment
for corruption (Andvig and Moene [6]) or a bureaucrat’s worries about his reputation
(Tirole [35]) are decreasing in the number of corrupt bureaucrats.
The literature on tax evasion, started by Allingham and Sandmo [3] and reviewed
by Andreoni et al. [5] and Slemrod and Yitzha k i[ 3 3 ]i st y p i c a l l yc o n c e r n e dw i t ht h e
choice of a risk-averse agent how much of his income to declare to the tax agency. In our
model, the choice between the formal and informal sector is all or nothing, and agents
are risk-neutral. In addition, unlike in the tax evasion literature, tax evasion comes at
the additional cost of not being able to use all public goods. Sandmo [27] discusses
optimal taxation in an economy where the government only redistributes income (it
does not provide public goods) and has a ﬁxed revenue requirement. Taxpayers are
divided into non-evaders and evaders. Only the latter can divide their labour between
the formal and the informal sector. Sandmo [27] also analyzes a worker’s labour supply,
which we assume ﬁxed. Cowell and Gordon [12] analyze how the tax rate aﬀects
tax evasion, taking the eﬀect on public good provision into account. Falkinger [14]
examines how tax evasion aﬀects optimal public good provision. In both cases, the
eﬀect is ambiguous in general. In our comparatively simple model, an increase in the
tax rate always increases the informal sector. The eﬀect of informal sector size on
public good provision is less relevant than the eﬀect on tax rates, because the latter
directly aﬀects a worker’s choice between sectors. An increase in the informal sector
generally leads a welfare-maximizing government to raise the tax rate, but a formal
sector welfare-maximizing government might respond either way.
Benjamini and Maital [7] were the ﬁrst to point out that social stigmatization can
4lead to multiple equilibria. When there are many (a few) honest taxpayers, a tax evader
will experience high (low) social stigma costs, and thus tax evasion will be small (large).
In the same vein, Schlicht [29] observed that multiple equilibria can occur when the
psychic cost of disobedience decreases with evasion. This result has been reﬁned by
Gordon [18], Myles and Naylor [26] and Kim [20], and applied to sales tax evasion by
Chang and Lai [9]. Cowell ([11], p. 110) identiﬁes additional reasons why tax evasion
becomes easier when it is more widespread: Tax evaders can learn from each other,
a n di tb e c o m e se a s i e rt oﬁnd a “bent” accountant. Myles and Naylor [26] mention that
corner equilibria become more prevalent when the probability of detection is decreasing
in the number of tax evaders, without explicitly modelling how this might occur. In
Myles and Naylor’s [26] and Kim’s [20] models, government policy is exogenous and
tax revenue “disappears” from the economy.
The literature on the informal sector hasb e e nr e v i e w e db yS c h n e i d e ra n dE n s t e
[30, 31] and G¨ erxhani [17]. Loayza [21] analyzes the informal sector in an endogenous
growth model with a congestible public good. As in our model, Loayza [21] assumes
that the informal sector can only make use of a part of the public good. Unlike in
our model, the congestible nature of the public good (e.g. roads) oﬀers an additional
channel through which the informal sector has a negative impact on the formal sector:
The informal sector’s use of the public good reduces its quality for the formal sector.
Workers maximize intertemporal utility and can move instantaneously from one sector
to the other. The government maximizes intertemporal social welfare. In our model,
workers and the government are myopic, and workers do not move instantaneously to
the sector with the highest payoﬀ. Loayza [21] restricts the parameters such that there
is a unique interior equilibrium. The purpose of our paper, however, is to see if there
can be multiple equilibria.
Carillo and Pugno [8] assume a ﬁrm can employ workers formally and informally, but
it can only give on-the-job training to formally employed workers, because it has a more
long-run relation with them. Carillo and Pugno [8] assume Marshallian externalities
from learning and show there may be two stable equilibria. In the “good” equilibrium
the number and the size of ﬁrms, the proportion of oﬃcial employment, overall output
5and eﬃciency are greater than in the “bad” equilibrium.
2.2 Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997)
In Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer’s [19] (hereafter JKS) model, the government taxes
and provides a public good for the formal sector, and the maﬁad o e st h es a m ef o r
the informal sector. The tax rates are constant, although JKS do discuss how the
government and the maﬁa would set their tax rates (p. 170-1). Alexeev et al. [1, 2]
model the government’s and maﬁa’s decision.
JKS ﬁnd that there are two stable equilibria, one with everyone in the formal sector
and one with everyone in the informal sector. When the formal sector is very large,
the government has high tax revenues and provides a lot of its public good, so that the
formal sector is an attractive place to work. The maﬁa, on the other hand, has low tax
revenues because the informal sector is small. Public good provision in the informal
sector is low, making it an unattractive place to work. Thus, all workers move to the
formal sector and this is a stable equilibrium. By the same reasoning, there is a stable
equilibrium with everyone in the informal sector. With two stable corner equilibria,
the interior equilibrium (if there is just one) must be unstable.
While JKS take the government’s and maﬁa ’ st a xr a t e sa sg i v e n ,o n ew o u l de x p e c t
that the two corner outcomes are also stable equilbria with endogenous tax rates. After
all, when the informal sector is very small, the maﬁa (government) has low (high)
potential revenues, and the government will always oﬀe rt h em o r ea t t r a c t i v et a x - p u b l i c
good package.
Let us now look at JKS’s model in more detail. LF (LI) is labour employed in the
(in)formal sector. Oﬃcial sector production YF is given by:
YF = QLF
with Q the government’s public good provision. With the wage rate normalized to one,
after-tax proﬁts ΠF are:
ΠF = p(1 − t)QLF − LF
with t the government’s tax rate. We have introduced product price p here to make
sure that at least in equilibrium, proﬁts are zero.
6Analogously, proﬁts in the informal ΠI sector are:
ΠI = p(1 − s)RLI − LI
with r the maﬁa’s tax rate and R its public good provision.
While JKS do not discuss this subject, it seems most natural and straightforward
to assume identical ﬁrms. A ﬁrm’s proﬁt πF in the formal sector would then be
πF = p(1 − t)QlF − lF
with lF the ﬁrm’s labour input, and analogously in the informal sector.
The problem with this setup is that proﬁts are linear in the labour input. This
makes it diﬃcult to specify a ﬁrm’s proﬁts and labour demand in out-of-equilibrium
situations, which is necessary to study the dynamics. In the formal sector, for instance,
ﬁrms would either not operate at all because they can only make a loss (if p(1−t)Q<1),
or they would make zero proﬁta ta n ys i z e( i fp(1 − t)Q =1 ) , or they would like to
hire an inﬁnite amount of labour as proﬁts keep increasing (if p(1−t)Q<1). Whereas
product price p might adjust to ensure zero proﬁts in the formal sector, there would
be out of equilibrium proﬁts or losses in the informal sector.
The easiest remedy for this is to eliminate the diﬀerence between ﬁrms and workers.
Each worker produces a homogeneous good for his own consumption. His output is Q
in the formal sector or R in the informal sector. Total production is QLF in the formal
and RLI in the informal sector.
Formally, the government’s tax revenue is given by T = tQLF. The supply of
public goods is increasing and concave in tax revenue: Q = Q(T),Q 0 > 0,Q 00 < 0.
Eliminating Q from the right-hand side of Q = Q(tQLF) yields Q = q(tLF),q 0 > 0, and
analogously for the informal sector R = r(sLI).
In an interior equilibrium, both LF and LI are positive, and workers are indiﬀerent
between the two sectors. JKS’s Figure 1, reproduced here as Figure 1a, purports to
show that the interior equilibrium is unstable. On the horizontal axis is the relative
size of the unoﬃcial economy, which we shall simply set equal to LI.J K S o n l y g i v e
a verbal description of the two curves shown in Figure 1a. The thick line (the public
7Figure 1: Multiple equilibria in the JKS model. a (left): JKS Figure 1. b (right):
amended version
goods function) represents the public good level that the government can provide for
a certain informal sector size according to Q = q[t(1 − LI)]. The public goods curve
is decreasing (dQ/dLI = −tq0 < 0), because the larger the informal sector, the lower
tax revenues and public good provision by the government.
JKS claim that the thin line (the ﬁrm mobility function) is downward sloping and
generally cuts the thick line from below. It is downward sloping because “the higher
is the supply of public goods in the oﬃcial economy, the fewer ﬁrms choose to operate
unoﬃcially.” (p. 166) However, while a higher Q does make the oﬃcial sector more
attractive, this does not imply that the ﬁrm mobility function is downward sloping.
On the curve, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between the oﬃcial and the unoﬃcial economy:








The ﬁrm mobility function thus has positive slope: The larger the unoﬃcial econ-
omy, the larger the size of the public good oﬀered by the maﬁa. In order to compete
8with this, the government should increase its own public good provision.
The corrected picture, with upward sloping ﬁrm mobility function, is shown in
Figure 1b. Figure 1a reproduces JKS’s dynamics, where LI assumes a non-equilibrium
value, the government oﬀers a Q on the tax collection curve, and the ﬁrms and the
government respond to each other in turns. Carrying this over to Figure 1b reveals
that the interior equilibrium (L∗
I,Q ∗) is still unstable. When public good provision
on the public good curve is below the ﬁrm mobility curve, all ﬁrms leave the oﬃcial
sector and the government’s public good provision drops down to zero. This is the bad
equilibrium. When public good provision is above the ﬁrm mobility curve, all ﬁrms
move to the oﬃcial sector and the government’s public good provision increases to QG.
This is the good equilibrium.
The dynamics in the present paper diﬀer from JKS, for two reasons. First, while
alternate moves may appeal in a two-player setup, it seems less adequate for a game
between a government and a great number of workers. Secondly, while in JKS the
government waits for the workers to adjust, it keeps oﬀering the same amount of public
good and charging the same tax rates. When workers are leaving (entering) the formal
sector, this results in a budget deﬁcit (surplus) for the government. This complication,
which JKS overlook, does not arise in the present paper where the government balances
i t sb u d g e ta te a c hp o i n ti nt i m e .
3T h e m o d e l
Our model builds on Johnson et al.’s [19] model, discussed in the previous section.
There is a continuum of workers in the economy, of mass one. They either work in the
formal sector F or in the informal sector I.3 Let LF (LI)b et h es h a r eo fw o r k e r si n
the (in)formal sector, LI =1− LF. In either sector, a worker puts in the same and
constant amount of work, and produces a homogeneous good for own consumption.
3This assumption, found in most of the theoretical literature (Alexeev et al. [2], Anderberg et al.
[4], Choi and Thum [10], Johnson et al. [19], Loayza [21], Marcouiller and Young [23], Straub [34] and
Carillo and Pugno [8], but not Alexeev et al. [1]), is justiﬁed when output in either sector is linear in
labour. Alternatively, Cowell ([11], p. 95) suggests a person may prefer not to work in both sectors,
because the tax authorities have a record of the activities of formal sector workers. This may make it
easier to detect illicit activities of formal sector workers.
9Per-capita production in the formal sector is yF = Q.4 In the informal sector it is
yI = sQ, 0 <s<1.Qis the level of public good provision by the government. The
formal sector enjoys the full beneﬁt of public goods. The informal sector only enjoys a
share s. We call s the degree of spillover of public goods from the formal to the informal
sector. There are some “public” goods from which the informal sector is excluded, for
instance the legal system to enforce contracts, and medical and social insurance. The
informal sector does, however, beneﬁt from other public goods like roads and public
transport.5
The government levies a tax at rate t on the production of the formal sector. In
the model, there are no (full-time) public sector workers.6 We can say that all formal
sector workers devote a fraction 1 − t of their time to producing the public good. A
public good that ﬁts this description very well is environmental protection. Everyone
beneﬁts from formal sector workers’ eﬀorts to abate the pollution resulting from their
production.
A worker’s consumption πF in the formal sector is:
πF =( 1− t)Q (1)
In the informal sector, deﬁne σ ≡ 1−s as the implicit tax rate, so that consumption
πI is:
πI = sQ =( 1− σ)Q (2)
The government’s tax revenues are T = tLFyF = tLFQ. The government uses the
tax revenues to produce the public good, according to Q = Q(T),Q (0) = 0,Q 0 >
0,Q 00 < 0. We can also say that T = C(Q) is the cost of producing Q, with C(0) =
C0(0) = 0,M C≡ C0 > 0f o rQ>0a n dC00 > 0. We thus have C(Q)=tLFQ,w h i c h
can be rewritten as:
AC(Q)=tLF (3)
4There might be an amount y0 > 0 that workers in either sector can produce without any public
good. We normalize this y0 to zero. Since the government taxes Q,t h i si m p l i e st h a ty0 is exempt
from taxation.
5Marcouiller and Young [23] allow informal sector workers to produce their own “order”.
6Frey and Weck [16] model the case where the bureaucracy levies taxes on the formal sector in
order to maximize the bureaucrat’s wage, the size of the bureaucracy, or a combination of both.





LFQ2 > 0( 4 )
Workers adjust sluggishly to a diﬀerence in remuneration between the sectors. They
do not compare payoﬀs in both sectors on a day-to-day basis, let alone move instanta-
neously to the higher-paying sector. Workers have made sector-speciﬁc investments in
real and human capital and in social networks and personal relationships (Schneider
[32]). Formal-sector workers may have moral inhibitions about going underground,
while informal-sector workers may fear awkward questions about their past as they
become visible as tax payers (Cowell [11], p. 97). However, we will not formally model
these barriers to adjustment.
When t<σ (and LF < 1), there will be a movement from the informal to the
formal sector. When t>σ (and LF > 0), there will be a movement from the formal
to the informal sector. When
• t = σ, or
• t<σ and LF =1 , or
• LF =0 , so that Q =0 ,
there will be no movement from one sector to another.
In equilibrium, no worker will want to move to another sector. Therefore, one of
the three conditions above must hold. An equilibrium is stable if the economy returns
to it after a small shock. It is easily seen that:7
Lemma 1 When LF =1is an equilibrium, it is stable. LF =0is a stable equilibrium
if and only if σ <t .An interior equilibrium L∗
F is stable if and only if dt(L∗
F)/dLF > 0.
The government’s objective is to maximize the weighted welfare of formal and
informal sector workers. It maximizes instantaneous welfare at each moment in time,
taking the allocation of workers between formal and informal sector as given. While
7Figures 2 to 4 illustrate this Lemma.
11for simplicity we assume an extreme degree of myopia on the part of the government, it
seems likely that the government does not look too far into the future. The government
may not be able to predict what happens in the more distant future, or it may not
be interested, because it concentrates on winning the next elections. Moreover, a far-
sighted government seems diﬃcult to reconcile with the notion of multiple equilibria.
As u ﬃciently far-sighted government would make sure not to get caught in a vicious
circle, but rather set the economy on a path to the good equilibrium.
It seems natural to assume that the government’s objective function would give
formal sector workers a higher (at least not a lower) weight than informal sector workers,
for the following three reasons. First, the feeling may be that the interests of the
taxpayers should matter most when determining the tax rate (Cowell [11], Ch. 7). The
workers who have decided not to pay taxes have forfeited the right to have their interests
considered. Secondly, the formal sector is likely to be more visible, better organized
and politically more powerful, for instance through trade unions (Frey [15]). Finally,
as we shall see, the higher the weight the government places on formal sector welfare,
the better the ultimate equilibrium is for everyone. Thus, a far-sighted government




Government maximizes weighted welfare, putting a weight of one on the formal sector
and a weight α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, on the informal sector. From (1), (2) and (3):
W ≡ LFπF + αLIπI =[ LF +( 1− LF)αs]Q − C(Q)( 5 )
Maximizing with respect to Q yields:
MC(Q)=LF +( 1− LF)αs (6)





C00 > 0( 7 )

































C0 [C0Q − C]
QCC00 (10)
is the elasticity of average to marginal cost for public good production.
For simplicity, we assume:
Condition 1 ε − 1 does not change sign for MC ∈ (0,1], where ε is deﬁn e db y( 1 0 ) .




β, β,γ ≥ 1, θ > 0( 1 1 )







γ−2 + φβ(β − 1)Q
β−2 > 0





Thus, when φ is negative/zero/positive, ε is larger than/equal to/smaller than
one.10
8Calculations for the Figures are available from the author upon request.
















10For φ 6=0 , ε is not a constant, but it is always either below or above one.
13T a b l e2 :S t a b l ee q u i l i b r i u mLF with a formal sector welfare maximizing government




min < σ <t F
max 0a n d1 – 0<L F < 1
σ >t F
max 11 1
4.2 The government only cares about the formal sector
The formal sector welfare maximizing government F sets the weight α in (5) to zero.
From (8) we see that tF = AC/MC < 1.11 From (9) it follows that:
Proposition 1 The optimal tax rate for the formal sector welfare maximizing gov-
ernment F is increasing/constant/decreasing in LF when the elasticity ε of average to
marginal cost for public good production is larger than/equal to/smaller than one.
Figures 2 to 4 illustrate the possible outcomes for the F government (the tW and
tα curves will be discussed later). In Figure 2, ε = 1 so that the tax rate does not vary
with LF. In the Figure, the formal sector tax rate t is below the implicit informal sector
tax rate σ, so that workers keep moving to the formal sector until they are all there.
However, it could also occur that tF > σ so that everyone would move to the informal
sector. In Figure 3, ε > 1s ot h a tt h et a xr a t ei si n c e a s i n gi nLF. In the Figure, the
formal sector tax rate equals the implicit informal sector tax rate for LF =0 .9. This
is the unique stable equilibrium. However, it could also occur that tF is everywhere
below (above) σ, so that everyone would move to the (in)formal sector. Finally, in
Figure 4, ε < 1 so that the tax rate is decreasing in LF. In the Figure, there are two
stable equilibria, one with everyone in the formal sector and one with everyone in the
informal sector. The interior equilibrium is unstable. This is then the only case with a
v i c i o u sa sw e l la sav i r t u o u sc y c l eu n d e rt h eF government. But here again, tF could
be everywhere below (above) σ, so that everyone would move to the (in)formal sector.
To summarize, let tF
max be the highest optimal tax rate. For ε < (>)1, this occurs
at LF =0 ( 1 ) . Let tF
min be the lowest tax rate, which occurs at LF =1 ( 0 )f o rε < (>)1.
The values of LF in a stable equilibrium are then as shown in Table 2.
11tF is not deﬁned for LF =0 , but this poses no problem, because there is no one to tax.
144.3 The government also weights the informal sector
Now let us examine what happens if the government weights the informal sector with





C00 ≥ 0( 1 2 )
with strict inequality for LF < 1. The more importance the government attaches to
the informal sector, the more of the public good it will provide. This is because the
government attaches more importance to the beneﬁts of the public good to the informal
sector, which doesn’t pay for the public good itself. Combining (12) with (4), we see









(1 − LF)s(C0Q − C)
C00Q2 ≥ 0
A higher tax rate for the formal sector implies that the formal sector becomes
less attractive. This will lead to a movement toward the informal sector, and to an
equilibrium with a smaller formal sector12 and the same tax rate.13 Then by (3), the
equilibrium Q is decreasing in α a n di ti sc l e a rf r o m( 1 )a n d( 2 )t h a tb o t hf o r m a la n d
informal sector payoﬀ decreases:
Proposition 2 For any starting value of LF, the higher the weight the government
attaches to the informal sector, the lower the formal sector size and the lower the
payoﬀ in both sectors in the stable equilibrium to which the economy evolves.
We have the somewhat paradoxical result that the more the government cares about
the informal sector, the worse will be the outcome for everyone. The explanation for this
paradox is that the government is extremely myopic. It maximizes weighted welfare,
given the distribution of workers over formal and informal sectors. Long-run welfare
would be best served by a government that maximizes the instantaneous welfare of the
formal sector only. This government sets the lowest tax rate, thus attracting workers
12LF will not change if initially LF =0 , because it cannot decrease further, or LF =1 , because
marginal beneﬁts on the RHS of (6) remain at 1.
13The tax rate remains at σ when the equilibrium is internal. The tax rate remains at t(1) when
the equilibrium remains at LF =1 . When LF =0 , the tax rate is irrelevant.
15Figure 2: Dynamics with F and W governments, ε =1[ C(Q)=Q2].
0.4
Figure 3: Dynamics with F, W and α =0 .13 governments, ε > 1[ C(Q)=1 .8Q2−Q3].
16Figure 4: Dynamics with F and W governments, ε < 1[ C(Q)=Q3 + 1
4Q2].
to the formal sector and maximizing its size. The larger the formal sector, the better
oﬀ everyone is in equilibrium.
When LF is close to zero, we see from (6) that the government would like to set
MC(Q)=αs. However, because the government can only tax the small number of
workers in the formal sector, it cannot collect enough tax revenues to produce the
optimal amount of Q (call it Q1). Therefore the government sets the tax at the max-
imum rate of one. Thus, for all LF ≤ L1
F, the government sets t =1 , where L1
F is
the LF where t = 1 maximizes unconstrained welfare. Note that L1
F < 1, since by (3)
AC(Q1)=L1
F and AC(Q1) <MC (Q1)=αs.
When LF is small, the tax rate of one will drive formal sector workers to the informal
sector. Thus, LF = 0 is always a stable equilibrium for α > 0.
Looking at dt/dLF in equation (9), we see that the ratio before square brackets on
the RHS is positive for LF >L 1
F.W h e n ε ≤ 1, the expression in square brackets is
negative and the tax rate is declining in LF throughout. When ε > 1, the expression
is negative for LF close to L1
F (since MC = αs at L1
F), but may become positive for
17Table 3: Stable equilibrium LF with a government that also weights the informal sector




min < σ <t (1) – 0 and 0 <L F < 1
σ >t (1) 0 and 1 0 and 1
higher LF. For simplicity, we assume that once dt/dLF is positive, it does not turn
negative for higher LF. This is the case if and only if d2t/dLF > 0a te v e r yp o i n tw h e r e
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Cost function (11) satisﬁes this condition.
In Figures 2 to 4, tW gives the tax rate for the W government that maximizes total
welfare, setting α = 1 in (5). Similar graphs can be drawn for any government with
α > 0. When ε ≤ 1,t W is always decreasing in LF. In Figure 2 with ε =1a n dF i g u r e
4w i t hε < 1, there are two stable equilibria: the good and the bad corner. However,
tW c o u l da l s ob ee v e r y w h e r ea b o v eσ, in which case the bad corner would be the only
equilibrium. When ε > 1,t W might also be monotonically decreasing in LF. This is
the case in Figure 3, where the bad corner is the only equilibrium.
For ε > 1, it is also possible that the optimal tax rate as a function of LF has
aU - s h a p e df o r m . A sar e s u l t ,t h eg o o de q u ilibrium could be an interior one. This
possibility is illustrated in Figure 3. The tα curve shows the optimal tax rate for a
government with α =0 .13 (call this the α government). The optimal tax rate is one
for LF < 0.05, but after that the tax rate moves closer and closer to the tF curve for
the F government. For the α government, the tax rate is increasing in LF for high
values of LF, as it is everywhere for the F government. With the α government, there
are two stable equilibria and one unstable equilibrium. For starting values of LF below
0.36, the economy moves to the bad equilibrium with everyone in the informal sector.
When LF is above 0.36, the economy moves to the good equilibrium with LF =0 .86.
The stable equilibria for a government that also cares about the informal sector
(α > 0i n( 5 ) )a r eg i v e ni nT a b l e3 .T h el o w e s tt a xr a t etW
min equals t(1) for ε ≤ 1, but
18may be lower than t(1) for ε > 1.
4.4 Comparison
Let us now compare the number of equilibria for the cases α =0a n dα > 0( T a b l e s2
and 3). For this, we have to look at the tax rates at LF =0a n dLF =1 . At LF =0 ,
the government sets the tax rate at one for α > 0a n da ttF(0) for α =0 . At LF =1 ,
there is no informal sector, so any government sets the tax rate at t(1). There are three
cases to consider:
1. ε < 1. There are two stable equilibria for α =0i ft(1) < σ <t F(0). There are two
stable equilibria for α > 0i fσ >t (1). Thus, the conditions for multiple equilibria
are less strict for α > 0.
2. ε =1 . There is always one stable equilibrium for α =0 . There are two stable
equilibria for α > 0i fσ >t (1), the same condition as for ε < 1.
3. ε > 1. There is always one stable equilibrium for α = 0. There are two stable
equilibria for α > 0i ft h el o w e s tt a xr a t etW
min is below σ.
Thus, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 3 There are C(Q) functions and values of s for which there is a single
stable equilibrium with α =0 , b u tt h e r ea r et w os t a b l ee q u i l i b r i aw i t hα > 0. The
opposite cannot occur.
Intuitively, when the government takes the interest of the informal sector into ac-
count, its policy depends on the size of the informal sector. When the informal sector
is small, the interest of the formal sector prevails. The tax rate is low, which makes
the formal sector relatively attractive. When the informal sector is large, its interest
prevails in government policy. The tax rate is high, which makes the informal sector
relatively attractive.
Proposition 3 is illustrated in Figures 2 to 4. In Figure 2, there are multiple equi-
libria (the good and bad corner) with the W government, whereas the F government
19always leads to the good equilibrium. Figure 3 features the bad corner and a good
interior equilibrium for a government with α =0 .13 and a better interior equilibrium
for the F government. In this case, the W government always leads to the bad corner
equilibrium. In Figure 4, both the good and the bad corner are equilibria with both
governments, however there are more starting points that lead to the bad equilibrium
under the W government.
In these three Figures, the α > 0 government sometimes leads to a worse outcome
than the F government, and sometimes to the same outcome. As we know from
Proposition 2, the α > 0 government cannot lead to a better outcome than the F
government.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The informal sector is large and growing around the world. There lures the danger
of a vicious circle, with a growing informal sector and higher tax rates for the formal
sector feeding on each other. However, an economy might also have the potential for a
virtuous circle, with a growing formal sector and lower tax rates reinforcing each other.
In this paper, we have investigated under which circumstances there can be vicious as
well as virtuous cycles, leading to bad and good equilibria, respectively.
We have let the government maximize instantaneous welfare. While this could be
relaxed in future work, a certain degree of myopia on the part of the government is
required to explain multiple equilibria. If the government were suﬃciently far-sighted,
it would never get caught in a bad equilibrium.
A key variable in our analysis is the elasticity of average to marginal costs for public
good production. When the government maximizes formal sector welfare, there can
only be multiple equilibria if this elasticity is less than one. However, the elasticity
could also be equal to or larger than one. And even if the elasticity is less than one,
there might just be a single equilibrium (either the bad or the good corner outcome).
The higher the weight the government attaches to informal sector welfare, the worse
the equilibrium that the economy ends up in. This result may seem puzzling at ﬁrst,
but it is due to the assumption that the government maximizes instantaneous welfare.
20The more the government cares about the informal sector’s beneﬁts from the public
good, the higher the tax rate it sets. This higher tax rate makes the formal sector less
attractive, so that its size is lower in equilibrium.
When the government takes the informal sector into account, multiple equilibria are
more likely to result. When the (in)formal sector is large, the government serves them
with a low (high) tax rate, which makes the (in)formal sector relatively attractive.
In this paper we have abstracted from enforcement, where the government can
punish tax evaders. Enforcement may also lead to multiple equilibria, if the probability
of being caught is decreasing in the number of tax evaders (Myles and Naylor [26]).
Dijkstra [13] introduces enforcement into the model of the present paper.
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